Abstract. Non-cooperative bargaining is modeled as an extensive-form game with uncertain information and infinite actions. Its resolution is a long-standing open problem and no algorithm addressing uncertainty over multiple parameters is known. We provide an algorithm to solve bargaining with any kind of one-sided uncertainty. Our algorithm reduces a bargaining problem to a finite game, solves this last game, and then maps its strategies with the original continuous game. Computational complexity is polynomial with two types, while with more types the problem is hard and only small settings can be solved in exact way.
Introduction
The automation of economic transactions through negotiating software agents is receiving a large attention in the artificial intelligence community. Autonomous agents can lead to economic contracts more efficient than those drawn up by humans, saving also time and resources [13] . We focus on the main bilateral negotiation setting: the bilateral bargaining. This setting is characterized by the interaction of two agents, a buyer and a seller, who can cooperate to produce a utility surplus by reaching an economic agreement, but they are in conflict on what specific agreement to reach. The most expressive model for non-cooperative bargaining is the alternating-offers [10] : agents alternately act in turns and each agent can accept the offer made by her opponent at the previous turn or make a new offer. Agents' utility over the agreements depends on some parameters: discount factor, deadline, reservation price. In real-world settings, agents have a Bayesian prior over the values of the opponents' parameters.
The alternating-offers is an infinite-horizon (agents can indefinitely bargain) extensive-form (the game is sequential) Bayesian (information is uncertain) game and the number of available actions to each agent is infinite (an offer is a real value). The appropriate solution concept is the sequential equilibrium [7] . The game theoretic study of bargaining with uncertain information is an open challenging problem. No work presented in the literature so far is applicable regardless of the uncertainty kind (i.e., the uncertain parameters) and degree (i.e., the number of the parameters' possible values). Microeconomics provides analytical results for settings without deadlines, for single uncertainty kinds, and with narrow degrees of uncertainty, e.g., over the discount factor of one agent with two possible values [11] and over the reservation price of both agents with two possible values per agent [1] . Computer science provides algorithms to search for sequential equilibria [8] only with finite games and without producing belief systems off the equilibrium path. This makes such algorithms not suitable for bargaining. Several efforts have been accomplished to extend the backward induction algorithm to solve games with uncertain information [3] . However, as shown in [4] , the solutions produced by these algorithms may not be equilibria. Finally, the algorithm provided by [4] solves settings with one-sided uncertain deadlines, but its extension to general settings appears to be impractical due to the mathematical machinery it needs.
The work in [4] provides the unique known computational complexity result, showing that with one-sided uncertain deadlines the problem is polynomial in the length of the bargaining independently of the number of types. However, this uncertainty situation is very special because all the types have the same utility functions before their deadlines. This fact leads all the types whose deadline is not expired to have the same behavior, drastically reducing thus the complexity of the problem. When discount factors and reservation prices are uncertain, the types have different utility functions and we expect that they have different optimal behaviors. The difficulty of developing an exact algorithm for the bargaining problem pushed the scientific community to produce approximate solutions. A large number of tactic-based heuristics are available, e.g., see [2] , but none provides bounds over the solution quality in terms of ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
In this paper, after having reviewed the alternating-offers protocol and its solution with complete information (Section 2), and after having discussed the model with uncertainty (Section 3), we present a sound and complete algorithm to solve settings with arbitrary kinds and degrees of uncertainty (Section 4). Our algorithm reduces the bargaining game to a finite game, solves this last game, and finally maps its equilibrum strategies to the original continuous game. We initially focus on settings with two possible types. We define a belief system µ and a strategy profile σ where agents can make a finite number of offers and the randomization probabilities with which agents make such offers are parameters. To compute the values of these parameters such that (µ, σ) is a sequential equilibrium, we build a finite game and we provide an algorithm based on support-enumeration to solve it. We show that the problem is polynomial in the deadline length. Then, we extend the algorithm to more than two types by exploiting mathematical programming and we experimentally evaluate it.
Bargaining Model and Complete Information Solution
We present the alternating-offers protocol [10] with deadlines. There are two agents, a buyer b and a seller s, who can play alternatively at discrete time points t ∈ N. The function ι ∶ N → {b, s} returns the agent that plays at time point t, and it is such that ι(t) ≠ ι(t + 1). We study single-issue bargaining because our aim is the study of settings with uncertainty and algorithms for single-issue problems can be easily extended to multi-issue problems as it is shown in [3] . Agents bargain on the value of a variable x ∈ R, e.g., representing the price. The pure strategies σ ι(t) (t) available to agent ι(t) at t > 0 are: offer(x), where x is the offer for the issue; accept, that concludes the bargaining with an agreement, formally denoted by (x, t), where x is such that σ ι(t−1) (t − 1) = offer(x) (i.e., the value offered at t − 1), and t is the time point at which the offer is accepted; exit, that concludes the bargaining with a disagreement, formally denoted by NoAgreement. At t = 0 only actions offer(x) and exit are available.
Seller's and buyer's utility functions, denoted by U s ∶ (R×N)∪NoAgreement → R and U b ∶ (R × N) ∪ NoAgreement → R respectively, return the agents' utility for each possible outcome. Each utility function depends on the following parameters: the reservation prices, denoted by RP b ∈ R + and RP s ∈ R + for buyer and seller respectively (we assume RP b ≥ RP s ), the discount factor, denoted by δ b ∈ (0, 1] and δ s ∈ (0, 1] for buyer and seller respectively, and the deadlines, denoted by T b ∈ N and T s ∈ N for buyer and seller respectively. The buyer's utility function is:
where ǫ < 0 (after T i , U i (x, t) is strictly negative and thus agent i strictly prefers to leave the game rather than reaching any agreement). The seller's utility function is analogous, except for
With complete information, the appropriate solution concept is the subgame perfect equilibrium. The solution can be found by using backward induction as follows. We call T = min{T b , T s } and we call x * (t) the ι(t)'s best offer at t, if this offer exists. It can be easily observed that the outcome of each subgame which starts at t ≥ T is NoAgreement, because at least one agent strictly prefers to exit the game rather than to reach any agreement. Now we consider the subgame which starts at t = T − 1. This subgame is essentially an ultimatum game [5] .
The subgames which start at time t < T − 1 can be studied in a similar way. Suppose that we have found x * (t + 1) and that we want to derive x * (t). We can consider the subgame composed of time points t and t + 1 as an ultimatum game variation in which ι(t + 1) accepts any offer x such that U ι(t+1) (x, t + 1) ≥ U ι(t+1) (x * (t + 1), t + 2) and offers x * (t + 1) otherwise.
The ι(t)'s best offer, among all the acceptable offers at time point t + 1, is the one which maximizes ι(t)'s utility. We can compute this offer as:
The computation of the values x * (t) is linear in t. We report the buyer's subgame perfect equilibrium strategies (the seller's ones are analogous):
Introducing Uncertainty
We consider one-sided uncertain settings where the buyer's parameters are uncertain to the seller (the reverse situation is analogous). Our game is an imperfect-information game in which the buyer can be of different types, each one with different values of RP b , δ b , and T b . Uncertainty is over the actual type of the buyer. For the sake of presentation, we describe our algorithm for the basic case where the number of buyer's types is two, we call them b 1 and b 2 . Then, we discuss how to extend it with more than two types. Without loss of generality we assume
denotes the power set and ω bi (t) denotes the probability that b's type is b i at time t). µ(0) are data of the problem.
Example 31
The parameters values are:
Assume that ι(0) = b and that the values ω b1 (0) and ω b2 (0) are arbitrary.
The appropriate solution concept is the sequential equilibrium [7] . It is a couple a = (µ, σ), also called assessment, in which µ is a belief system that specifies how agents must update their beliefs during the game and σ is the agents' strategy profile that specifies how they must act. µ must be consistent with σ and σ must be sequentially rational given µ. On the equilibrium path, µ is consistent to σ if it is equal to the beliefs derived from σ by using the Bayes rule. Off the equilibrium path, the Bayes rule is not applicable and two notions of consistency can be employed: weak consistency does not pose any constraint, while strong consistency requires that a sequence of fully mixed strategies exists such that its limit converges to σ and that the limit of the sequence of beliefs derived from the fully mixed strategies by using the Bayes rule converges to µ. In bargaining problems, strong consistency is commonly used because it allows one to exclude non reasonable equilibria. We remark that every game admits at least one strong sequential equilibrium. Off the equilibrium path we impose that is, if at time point t we have ω bi (t) = 0, then for any τ > t we keep ω bi (τ ) = 0.
The Algorithm
Since bargaining with uncertainty may not admit any equilibrium in pure strategies, as shown in [4] , we directly search for equilibria in mixed strategies. The basic idea behind our work is to solve the bargaining problem by reducing it to a finite game, deriving equilibrium strategies such that on the equilibrium path the agents can act only a finite set of actions, and then by searching for the agents' optimal strategies on the path. Our work is structured in the following three steps. 1) We analytically derive an assessment a = (µ, σ) in which the randomization probabilities of the agents are parameters and such that, when the parameters' values satisfy some conditions, a is a sequential equilibrium. 2) We formulate the problem of finding the values of the agents' randomization probabilities in a as the problem of finding a sequential equilibrium in a reduced bargaining game with finite actions, and we prove that there always exist values such that a is a sequential equilibrium. 3) We develop an algorithm based on support enumeration to solve the reduced game when the types are two and we show that its computational complexity is polynomial in the agents' deadlines. Then we develop an algorithm based on linear complementarity mathematical programming to solve the case with more than two types.
Deriving Equilibrium Strategies
Without loss of generality, on the equilibrium path we study only time points t < T b1 . This is because, if agents reach time points t ≥ T b1 on the equilibrium path, then the bargaining at t is a game with complete-information in which agents are b 2 and s. Indeed, b 1 never makes offers at time t ≥ T b1 , action exit being the dominant action, and therefore, if action offer(x) is observed at t ≥ T b1 , the Bayes rule imposes that ω b1 (t) = 0. We build an assessment a such that, on the equilibrium path, the ι(t)'s offers at t < T b1 belong to a finite set X(t) ∶= {x * bi (t) ∶ ∀i}, where x * bi (t) is the ι(t)'s optimal offer at t in the corresponding complete-information game between b i and s computed as previously discussed. Offering at t any x ∈ X(t) does not allow ι(t) to improve her expected utility. In Fig. 1 we show x * b1 (t) and x * b2 (t) related to Example 31. We connect the offers x * b1 (t) with a dotted line and the offers x * b2 (t) with a dashed line.
(t) in the complete information games between s and bi (see Example 31).
We focus on a. For each t < T b1 we rank the values in X(t) in increasing order and we call b w = arg max i∈{b1,b2} {x * i (0)} and b s = arg min i∈{b1,b2} {x * i (0)} where w means weak and s means strong. In Fig. 1 we have b w = b 1 and b s = b 2 . According to [12] , the adjectives 'strong' and 'weak' refer to the contractual power of the corresponding buyer's type: in complete-information settings the seller's expected utility is larger when it bargains with b w rather than when it bargains with b s . In two cases, the type with the strongest contractual power at t = 0 is not the strongest for all t > 0. This happens, first, when there exists at least a time point t where x * bs (t) > x * bw (t), second, when T bw > T bs . These two cases represent two exceptions that can be easly tackled by modifying the computation of x * bs (t) and x * bw (t). For reasons of space, we omit their description. The basic idea behind a is that, when agents are forced to make the offers in X(t), b w can gain utility from disguising herself as b s , making the optimal b s 's offers, while b s prefers to signal her own type, making offers different from the b w 's ones. That is, b w acts in order to increase her expected utility with respect to the situation where s believes b's type to be b w with certainty. The same idea is used in [1] .
We focus on the buyer's behaviour. On the equilibrium path, b w randomizes between offering x * bw (t) (or, equivalently, accepting x * bw (t − 1)) and offering x * bs (t) (the offer x * bs (t − 1) is always accepted, leading to the largest possible utility), whereas b s offers x * bs (t) in pure strategies (or, equivalently, accepts x * bs (t − 1)). We denote by 1 − α(t) and α(t) the b w 's randomization probabilities over offering x * bw (t)/accepting x * bw (t − 1) and offering x * bs (t), respectively, and we consider α(t) as parameters. We remark that, if α(t) = 1, then the strategies of b w and b s are pure and they are the same. On the equilibrium path, the beliefs are updated according to the Bayes rule. We call ω * bi (t) the probability over type b i at time t produced according to the Bayes rule after that b made offer(x * bs (t−1)) at time t−1. We have ω *
and ω * bw (t) = 1 − ω * bs (t). We notice that when the strategies are pure, if α(t − 1) = 1, then ω * bw (t) = ω bw (t − 1) and ω * bs (t) = ω bs (t − 1), while, if α(t − 1) = 0, then ω * bw (t) = 0 and ω * bs (t) = 1. To characterize b's strategies off the equilibrium path, at each time t we divide the domain of x as:
We call y the value such that σ s (t − 1) = offer(y). The b w 's strategies are: if y ∈ D1, then y is rejected; if y ∈ D2, then y is accepted with probability of 1 − α(t) and rejected to offer x * bs otherwise, and, if y ∈ D3, then the offer is accepted (no better agreement can be reached from time point t + 1 on). The b s 's strategies are exactly her optimal strategies in the completeinformation game between b s and s: if y ∈ D1 or y ∈ D2, then the offer is refused and, if y ∈ D3, then the offer is accepted. We notice that, if α(t) = 1, then b w and b s have the same strategies also off the equilibrium path. Formally, the strategies are (at t > T b1 the buyer's strategies are those with complete information; the strategies in the case in which the buyer's type is b s and ω bs (t) = 0 are):
To characterize the beliefs and s's strategies off the equilibrium path, at each time t we divide the domain of x as:
′ ∶= (−∞, x * bs (t − 1)). We call y the value such that σ b (t − 1) = offer(y)
(notice that we cannot use '=', since the cases with '=' are on the equilibrium path). Defining κ(t, y) =
, the belief system is:
We focus on the seller's behaviour. On the equilibrium path, s randomizes between offering x * bs (t) (or, equivalently, accepting x * bs (t−1)) and offering x * bw (t) (the offer x * bw (t − 1) is always accepted, leading to the largest possible utility). We denote by β(t) and 1 − β(t) the s's randomization probabilities over offering x * bs (t)/accepting x * bs (t − 1) and offering x * bw (t), respectively, and we consider β(t) as parameters. Off the equilibrium path, the s's strategies are: if y ∈ D1 ′ , then the offer is accepted; if y ∈ D2 ′ , then the acceptance probability decreases linearly in y such that, if y goes to x * bw (t − 1), then it goes to 1 and, if y goes to x * bs (t − 1), then it goes to β(t) (the s's probability to offer x * bw (t) is 1 minus the acceptance probability); if y ∈ D3 ′ , then it is rejected to offer x * bw (t) if β(t) < 1 and x * bs (t) otherwise. Formally the strategies are (at t > T b1 the seller's strategies are those with complete information):
Call σ = (σ * bw , σ * bs , σ * s ). We state the following theorem.
Theorem 41 If α(t), β(t) ∈ [0, 1] are such that, limited to the offers in X(t),
σ is sequentially rational given µ, then a = (µ, σ) is a sequential equilibrium.
Proof. We assume that there are values α(t), β(t) ∈ [0, 1] such that, limited to the offers in X(t), σ is sequentially rational given µ and we prove: (i) sequential rationality off the equilibrium path and (ii) Kreps and Wilson's consistency. (The computation of the values of α(t), β(t) is discussed in the following sections.) To prove (i) we need to show that agents cannot gain more by making offers not belonging to X(t). At first, we characterize agents' strategies on the equilibrium path because it is useful for our proof. We do not consider the trivial cases in which ω bw (0) = 1 or ω bs (0) = 1; they can be solved as complete-information games. It can be easily observed that if ω bw (0) < 1 then α(t) > 0 for every t. Indeed, let suppose ι(0) = b and ω bw (0) < 1, if α(0) = 0, then b w and b s make different offers at time t = 0 and s accepts both of them at t = 1. In this case b w can increase her utility acting as b s . Thus, two situations are possible: either 0 < α(t) < 1 or α(t) = 1. If 0 < α(t) < 1, then b w randomizes between offering x bw (t) and x bs (t), so necessarily 0 < β(t + 1) < 1 because the game is non-degenerate. Otherwise, if α(t) = 1, then necessarily β(t + 1) = 1 because the game in non-degenerate and the case β(t + 1) = 0 cannot lead to an equilibrium (b w can increase her utility by offering x * bw (t) that will be always accepted). Now, we are in the position to prove sequential rationality off the equilibrium path. We focus on the case 0 < α(t) < 1 and 0 < β(t + 1) < 1. We consider b w . Offering any x > x * bw (t) at time t is dominated by offering x * bw (t) because all these offers are accepted with a probability of one and x * bw (t) gives a larger utility to b w . By construction, all the offers x * bs (t) < x < x * bw (t) give to b w the same expected utility and all the offers x < x * bs (t) are rejected, so the b w 's expected utility cannot be increased by performing them. In a similar way, it is possible to analyze the strategies of b s and s. In the case of s, if she acts at t = 0 or t > 0 after that b makes an off-equilibrium-path offer, her strategy will be pure. It can be shown that, if σ b (t − 1) = offer(x) with x < x * bs (t − 1) and β(t) < 1, then s's optimal action is to offer x * bw (t). Therefore, agents cannot gain more by making offers not belonging to X(t).
In order to prove (ii), we need to provide a fully mixed strategy σ bi,n (t) such that lim n→∞ σ bi,n (t) = σ * bi (t) and lim n→∞ ω bi,n (t) = ω bi (t) where ω bi,n (t) are the sequences of beliefs derived from σ bi,n (t) by Bayes rule and ω bi (t) are the beliefs prescribed by µ(t). The fully mixed strategies are:
where A(n) and B(n) are functions of n such that they go to zero as n goes to infinity and the sum over the probabilities of all actions is one. ◻
Building the Reduced Bargaining Game
The previous section drastically reduces the complexity of solving a bargaining game, leaving open only the determination of the values of the randomization probabilities such that Theorem 41 holds. In this section, we formulate the problem of computing these values as the problem of solving a reduced bargaining game with finite actions. Since each finite game admits at least one equilibrium strategy, there always exist values such that Theorem 41 holds.
To compute the values of α(t) and β(t) we "extract" the equilibrium path prescribed by assessment a given in the previous section. We build an imperfectinformation extensive-form game with finite actions. It can be represented by a game tree built as follows. Fig. 2 depicts the tree related to Example 31; for the sake of simplicity, we denote accept by 'A' and offer(x) by 'x'; A ′ and A ′′ label two different As of the same buyer's type at the same t. In the root of the tree, nature plays drawing the buyer's type: b 1 or b 2 with probability ω b 1 (0) and ω b 2 (0), respectively. Since the game is with imperfect information, s cannot distinguish whether her opponent's type is b 1 or b 2 unless she observes an action that can be made only by b 1 or by b 2 , respectively (e.g., in Fig. 2 , action x * b1 (0) can be accomplished only by b 1 ). Customarily in game theory, decision nodes that an agent cannot distinguish constitute an information set (in Fig. 2 , dashed lines connect decision nodes of the same information set). 1) ), the available actions are accept and offer(x * bs (t)). Action accept at time t leads to a terminal node in which the agents reach the agreement (x, t) where x is such that σ ι(t−1) (t − 1) = offer(x). In Fig. 2 , under the terminal nodes, we report the agents' utilities U s (x, t), U b (x, t). If b i = b s and σ s (t − 1) = offer(x * bs (t − 1)) then the only possible action is accept, otherwise, if σ s (t − 1) = offer(x * bw (t − 1)), the only available action is offer(x * bs (t)). Suppose ι(t) = s. If σ b (t − 1) = offer(x * bw (t − 1)) then the only possible action is accept, otherwise, if σ b (t − 1) = offer(x * bs (t − 1)), the available actions are accept and offer(x * bw (t)). Let be t = T b1 − 1. If x * bw (t) > x * bs (t), the tree building rules are those described for the previous case. Otherwise, if x * bw (t) = x * bs (t), when b i = b w and σ s (t−1) = offer(x * bw (t)) the only available action is accept, as in Example 31 (see Fig. 1 ). There cannot be any equilibrium when a buyer's type b i randomizes at t over accepting and offering offers of the same sequence of offers x * bi (t). We notice that the size of the tree is linear in T b1 . The values of α(t) and β(t) can be computed finding a sequential equilibrium in the above reduced bargaining problem. By definition, the value of α(t) is equal to the probability with which b w makes offer(x * bs (t)) at t in the reduced bargaining game, while the value of 1 −β(t) is equal to the probability with which s makes offer(x * bw (t)) at t in the reduced bargaining game. Since any finite game admits at least one sequential equilibrium, there always exist values of α(t) and β(t) such that a is a strong sequential equilibrium, namely, Theorem 41 always holds.
Solving the Reduced Bargaining Game
To compute an equilibrium, at first we represent the game in the sequence form [6] where agents' actions are sequences in the game tree.
The sequence form is represented with a sparse matrix in which the agent i's actions are the sequences of her extensive form actions connecting the root of the tree to any information set of i. To avoid confusion, we shall use 'sequence' for the actions of the sequence form and 'action' for the actions of the extensive-form. For the sake of simplicity, we define different b's sequences for each different type. Considering the game tree reported in Fig. 2 , the set of agent i's sequences Q i is:
where ∅ is the empty sequence. Given two sequences q and q ′ with q ∈ Q bi and q ′ ∈ Q s , the payoffs are non-null only if the node reached performing the combination of sequences q and q ′ is a terminal node. Let consider the subtree of type b 1 shown in Fig. 2 . The node reached performing q = ⟨x * b2 (0)⟩ and q ′ = ⟨x * b1 (1)⟩ is a non terminal node and, therefore, the payoffs are null, whereas the node reached performing q = ⟨x * b2 (0)⟩ and q ′ = ⟨A ′′ ⟩ is a terminal node and the payoffs are U s = 0.16 and U b = 0.55. We show in Table 1 the payoff bimatrix for b 1 and s (for reason of space we omit the empty sequences ∅). The payoff bimatrix for b 2 and s is defined similarly. Table 1 . Payoff bimatrix for b1 and s.
The sequence form presents some constraints over the probabilities with which the sequences are played by agents. We denote by p i (q) the probabil-ity with which agent i makes sequence q. The constraints on the probabilities of the empty sequences are (by convention, we set ω s (0) = 1):
constraints on the probabilities of non-empty sequences are:
where I q is the set of information sets reachable performing q, h q is a information set belonging to I q , a is an action available at information set h q , and q a is the sequence obtained by adding action a to sequence q. Let consider s in Fig. 2 
, because only one information set is reachable by performing q. The values of α(t) and β(t) are easily computable on the basis of probability p i (q). More precisely, called q a b w 's sequence that ends at time point t − 1 with ι(t) = b, we have
. The values of β(t) can be computed on the basis of p s (q) in a similar way.
To solve the game we use the PNS algorithm [9] because it results very efficient: we can safely check a very small number of supports. Proof. We show that on the equilibrium path b w cannot make accept at time t with probability of 1 in all the decision nodes where multiple actions are available. Assume by contradiction that b w makes it. Then, s's best response is to make accept at time t + 1 with probability of 1. However, if s makes such action at t + 1, b w 's best response is to make offer(x * bs (t)) at time t and thus we have a contradiction. We show that on the equilibrium path b w cannot make offer(x bs (t)) at time t > 0 with probability of 1 in all the decision nodes where multiple actions are available. Assume by contradiction that it happens. Then, s's best response is to make accept at time t − 1 with probability of 1. Therefore, time point t would never be reached on the equilibrium path and then we have a contradiction.
The same above reasoning can be applied to show that on the equilibrium path s cannot make with probability of 1 neither accept at time t > 1 nor offer(x bw (t)) at time t > 0. Thus, the unique possible agents' strategies on the equilibrium path are those reported in the theorem. If the fully mixed strategy is a Nash equilibrium, then it is by definition a sequential equilibrium. This is because every action is played with positive probability. If it is not an equilibrium, then necessarily the game concludes at t = 1. ◻
The above theorem shows that for each bargaining problem we need to check only one joint support: if the fully mixed strategy is not an equilibrium, then on the equilibrium path the game concludes at t = 1. In this second case, to compute agents' equilibrium strategies off the equilibrium path it is sufficient to solve the reduced bargaining game from t ≥ 2 with initial beliefs. The computational complexity of finding agents' equilibrium strategies on the equilibrium path is polynomial in T b1 , because the computational complexity of solving a linear feasibility problem is polynomial in the number of variables, this last number rises linearly in T b1 , and the number of joint supports to be checked is constant in the size of the game. Off the equilibrium path a number of joint supports that rises linearly in T b1 must be checked, then the computational complexity is polynomial in T b1 . We use AMPL and CPLEX to solve the game. The computational times are negligible (< 1 s) even for large problems (up to T b1 = 500) with a 2.33 GHz 8 GB RAM UNIX computer. We report in Tab. 2 the values of α(t) and β(t) for Example 31 with different values of initial beliefs. (2) Table 2 . Values of α(t)s and β(t)s. When ω b 1 (0) = 0.1 and ω b 1 (0) = 0.7 players always act in pure strategies; when ω b 1 (0) = 0.8 players randomize.
Extension to More than Two Types
Here the idea is the same of the two-type solution. At first, we compute all the sequences of optimal offers x * bi (t) in the complete-information games between b i and s. We rank the buyer's types from the strongest to the weakest according to x * bi (0). At t each buyer's type b i randomizes over all the offers x * bj (t) such that b j is not weaker than b i and b j is believed by s with positive probability. More precisely, we denote by α i,j (t, Θ b (t)) the probability with which b i makes offer x * bj at time point t given that the buyer's types believed by s with strictly positive probability are those belonging to Θ b (t). Only the probabilities α i,j (t, Θ b (t)) with x * bi (t) > x * bj (t) and b j ∈ Θ b (t) can be non-null. The system of belief is such that, once offer x * bi (t) is observed, all the types b j with x * bj (t) < x * bi (t) are removed from Θ b (t). Then, the number of possible 2 , b 3 }, and {b 3 }. Similarly, the seller's strategy can be represented by probabilities β j (t, Θ b (t)), i.e., the probability to accept x * bi (t − 1)/ offer x * bi (t) at t when the buyer's types believed with positive probabilities are
The construction of the game tree is accomplished according to the following rules: 1) no buyer's types makes offer strictly weaker than her optimal offer in the complete-information game; 2) at time t > 0, no agent (buyer and seller) makes offers strictly weaker (w.r.t. her utility function) than the one made by the opponent at the previous time point t − 1; 3) at time t > 0, no agent (buyer and seller) makes offers that, if accepted at t + 1, provide her the same utility she receives by accepting the offer made by the opponent at t − 1; 4) no buyer's type makes offers besides min{T bi , T s } and the seller does not make offer besides min{max{T bi }, T s }; 5) at time t > 0, an offer x i is not made if the buyer's type b i is out of the game (i.e., t >= T bi or type b i has been excluded because the buyer has previously made an offer strictly weaker than the optimal completeinformation offer of b i ).
It can be easily observed that the size of the tree rises exponentially in the length of the deadlines. Differently from what we did for the two-type case, here do not use support-enumeration techniques, but we resort to linearcomplementarity mathematical programming. This is because the number of supports rises as 4 n where n is the number of agents' actions, while the space of solutions over which linear complementarity works rises as 2.6 n . We implemented an ad hoc version of the Lemke's algorithm with perturbation as described in [8] to compute a sequential equilibrium. The algorithm is based on pivoting (similarly to the simplex algorithm) where perturbation affects only the choice of the leaving variable. We coded the algorithm in C language by using integer pivoting and the same approach of the revised simplex (to save time during the update of the rows of the tableau). We executed our algorithm with a 2.33 GHz 8 GB RAM UNIX computer. We produced several bargaining instances characterized by the number of buyer's types (from 2 up to 6) and the deadline T = min{max{T bi }, T s } (from 6 up to 500). Tab. 3 reports the average computational times over 10 different bargaining instances; we denote by '-' the cases whose execution exceeds one hour. Table 3 . Computational times for solving a bargaining game with linear complementarity mathematical programming (T = min{max{T b i }, Ts}).
As it can be observed, the computational times are exponential in the bargaining length and have the number of types as basis and only small settings can be solved by using linear-complementarity mathematical programming. Notice that the support-enumeration approach used for the two-types case is much faster than the linear-complementarity approach. This pushes for the development of algorithms for finding approximate solutions.
Conclusions and Future Works
The study of strategic bargaining with uncertainty is a challenging game theoretic problem. The literature provides several heuristics-based approaches generally applicable to any uncertain setting, while the optimal approaches work only with very narrow uncertainty settings. In particular, no algorithm works with uncertainty over multiple parameters. In this paper, we focused on one-sided uncertainty. Our main result is the reduction of the bargaining to a finite game. This allows one to resort to well known techniques to solve finite games. We proved that with two types the problem is polynomial (by using support-enumeration techniques), while with more types our algorithm requires exponential time. As a result, only small settings can be solved in exact way. Nevertheless, our reduction allows one to resort to techniques to find approximate equilibria.
In future works, on the one hand, we shall develop algorithms to find an ǫ-approximate equilibrium with a provable bound over ǫ and, on the other hand, we characterize solutions to produce insight over the structure of the problem and design more efficient exact algorithms.
